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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Congress amended section 7803(a) to require the IRS 
Commissioner to ensure that IRS employees act in accordance with 
statutory rights to taxpayers, thus formally codifying the list in IRS 
Publication 1, also known as the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (“TBOR”).1  
This move signified Congressional intent to balance the IRS’s long-
standing goal of efficient tax administration with a new focus on 
fairness and transparency, and has also been lauded as a major step 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; HBA, 2014, University of 
Toronto. The author would like to thank Professor Tracy Kaye for her abundant guidance and 
assistance. 
  1  Amanda Bartmann, Making Taxpayer Rights Real: Overcoming Challenges to 
Integrate Taxpayer Rights into a Tax Agency’s Operations, 69 THE TAX LAWYER 597, 598 
(2016). 
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forward in pursuing taxpayer compliance.2  However, there exists a 
strong tension between efficiency and fairness.  An administration 
focused purely on efficiency will naturally seek to streamline 
procedures as much as possible, which may leave important interests 
such as privacy, confidentiality, appeals, and due process by the 
wayside.3 
In recent years, the IRS has experienced severe budget cuts that 
have gravely impacted its ability to handle tax matters efficiently and 
accurately, while still prosecuting tax controversies through due 
process.4  As then-IRS Commissioner John Koskinen stepped down 
from his position in November 2017, he strongly criticized 
Congress’s underfunding of the IRS.5  The outgoing Commissioner 
noted that chronic underfunding has crippled the agency deeply, 
highlighting antiquated technology systems and agency 
understaffing as particular areas of concern.6  As Commissioner 
Koskinen prepared for his retirement from the agency, he made an 
appeal to the public: 
Look, 60 percent of our hardware and 22 percent of our 
software is out of date . . . We’re down 7,000 revenue 
agents . . . Even our most aggressive critics agree that if you 
give us money, we’ll get you more money back . . . Every 1 
percent drop in compliance costs $33 billion a year.  The 
amount of money the government loses every day by 
underfunding the IRS is already five to eight times the amount 
 
 2  Id. 
 3  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-165, IRS’s FISCAL YEARS 2017 AND 2016 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 29 (“Effective tax administration is the IRS’s core responsibility. 
Providing efficient taxpayer services and enforcing the tax laws are the IRS’s primary focuses. 
In recent years, the volume and complexity of legislative changes to the Tax Code have been 
a challenge. Often, the IRS must implement these legislative changes within limited 
timeframes that strain resources and disrupt workload planning.”). 
 4  See Alan Rappeport, Under Trump, an Already Depleted I.R.S. Could Face Deep Cuts, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/02/us/politics/trump-
mnuchin-irs.html. See also Michael Grunwald, The IRS is Building a Safe to House Trump’s 
Tax Returns, POLITICO (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/ 
15/john-koskinen-taxes-215830 (noting that the IRS was down to 80,000 employees in 2017 
from a peak of 130,000, and that the IRS has lost $900 million in funding since 2010).   
 5  Joe Davidson, IRS Chief Departs, Blasting Congress for Budget Cuts Threatening Tax 
Agency, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/powerpost/wp/2017/11/07/irs-chief-departs-blasting-congress-for-budget-cuts-
threatening-tax-agency/. 
 6  Id.; Grunwald, supra note 4, at 6 (“[If the IRS were to receive more resources,] first, 
we’d stop shrinking. We’d upgrade the IT system. We’d provide better service to taxpayers 
on the phone.  We’d hire more revenue agents and criminal investigators—we don’t need 
20,000 more people, but definitely 5,000 or 6,000 more.”). 
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of money it’s saving on the budget.7 
As the IRS continues to suffer further budget cuts, even in the face 
of expanded regulatory responsibilities, significant administrative 
and security concerns grow evermore exacerbated.  Entrusted with 
the sensitive financial information of hundreds of millions of 
Americans, the IRS must also devote a not insignificant amount of 
resources to protecting such information from both domestic and 
international threats. 
This Note examines how the IRS’s lack of funding has 
exacerbated the agency’s struggles to pursue both efficient tax 
administration while ensuring that taxpayer rights are respected and 
upheld.  Part I of this Note summarizes the administrative and 
legislative background of the conceptual Taxpayer Bill of Rights, 
examining the states of affairs pre and post-2015 codification.  Part 
II more closely examines the rights to taxpayer privacy and 
confidentiality.  Part III details IRS tools and activities in which 
these rights may be most concerned, and Part IV addresses the IRS’s 
current underfunding and how this underfunding significantly 
frustrates the IRS’s ability to fulfill its mission. 
A. TBOR Overview & Codification in § 7803 
The United States tax system is one of voluntary compliance: 
individual taxpayers are expected to report and pay their taxes, 
subject to potential auditing from the IRS.8  “Taxpayer charters” are 
usually statements enumerating certain basic rights and obligations 
that both taxpayers and their respective tax administrations are 
expected to adhere to, while in the ordinary course of tax 
compliance.9  Though taxpayer charters have become the norm for 
most advanced countries, the United States has lagged significantly 
behind in this regard.10  Its official Taxpayer Bill of Rights was not 
issued as IRS Publication 1 until 2014, and remained uncodified until 
 
 7  Grunwald, supra note 4, at 5. 
 8  Encouraging Voluntary Compliance, IRM 20.1.1.2.1 (Feb. 2, 2011).  But see United 
States v. Middleton, 246 F.3d 825, 840 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The word voluntary is not the 
equivalent of optional.  To the extent that income taxes are said to be voluntary, they are only 
voluntary in that one files the returns and pays the taxes without the IRS first telling each 
individual the amount due and then forcing payment . . . .”). 
 9  OECD, Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations – Practice Note, at 3-4, CENTRE FOR TAX 
POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION TAX GUIDANCE SERIES (Aug. 2003), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/administration/Taxpayers’_Rights_and_Obligations-
Practice_Note.pdf. 
 10  See generally Keith Fogg & Sime Jozipovic, How can Tax Collection be Structured to 
Observe and Preserve Taxpayer Rights: A Discussion of Practices and Possibilities, 69 THE 
TAX LAWYER 513, 539-560 (2016). 
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late 2015 when Congress incorporated it as Section 7803 of the 
Internal Revenue Code [“IRC” or “Code”].11 
Publication 1 and its section 7803 counterpart are not the first 
attempts the United States has made to create federal tax charters.12  
A laundry list was previously codified into the Internal Revenue 
Code in 1988, 1996, and 1998, although their scattered burial in the 
sea of IRC statutory provisions prevented the average layman from 
being properly informed of these rights.13  When the IRS 
conspicuously adopted the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (“TBOR”) in 
2014, issued Publication 1 to all taxpayers, and posted Publication 1 
Notices in IRS offices, information about these rights became 
drastically more accessible to the average taxpayer.14  Congress 
codified the rights listed in Publication 1 in 2015.15  In accordance 
with the passage of this legislation, the Internal Revenue 
Commissioner’s official duties now include ensuring that IRS 
employees “are familiar with and act in accord with taxpayer 
rights.”16 
According to Professors Alice Abreu and Richard Greenstein, 
this codification has the potential to achieve more than simply 
formalizing these rights; rather, it has several practical effects that 
significantly advance the interests of taxpayers.17  Under traditional 
statutory construction principles, “a statute should be construed so 
that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous, void, or insignificant.”18  As such, one 
should not interpret the TBOR’s addition to section 7803 as a mere 
formality, but as a clear sign of Congress’ intent to expand the 
 
 11  The IRS initially released the TBOR as Publication 1.  1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 
2016 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 98, https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/ 
2016-ARC/ARC16_Volume1_MSP_05_TBOR.pdf. 
 12  Your Rights as a Taxpayer: The Taxpayer Bill of Rights, IRS PUBLICATION 1 REV. 9-
2017, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2019); IRC § 7803 (2018). 
 13  See Omnibus Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730 (1988) 
[hereinafter “TBOR 1”]; Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 
(1996) [hereinafter “TBOR 2”]; Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3, Pub. L. No. 105-206, tit. III, 112 
Stat. 685 (1998) [hereinafter “TBOR 3”]. 
 14  Bartmann, supra note 1, at 598 (“Leading up to the IRS’s adoption of the TBOR, 
taxpayers’ awareness of their rights was significantly lacking. A 2012 survey conducted for 
the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) found fewer than half of U.S. taxpayers believed they 
have rights before the IRS, and only 11% said they knew what those rights were.”). 
 15  I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3) (2018).  See also Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. Q, § 401 (2015). 
 16  I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3) (2018).   
 17  Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Embracing the TBOR, 157 TAX NOTES 1281, 
1282 (Nov. 27, 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2017/157tn1281.pdf. 
 18  Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004). 
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breadth of the Commissioner’s duties.19  Furthermore, section 
7803(a)’s inclusion of the TBOR creates a normative basis for 
taxpayers to demand legal remedies when their rights are violated.20  
Quoting the Supreme Court, Professors Abreu and Greenstein argue 
that the formal enactment of taxpayer rights naturally supports the 
taxpayers’ pursuit of legal remedies when their rights are violated.21  
Finally, even though the IRS claims that Publication 1 “takes the 
multiple existing rights embedded in the tax code and groups them 
into ten broad categories [to make] them more visible and easier for 
taxpayers to find,” Abreu and Greenstein argue that codification of 
the TBOR may have created new rights for taxpayers.22  Under the 
“contentious view” of the taxpayer-government relationship, where 
“even the most benevolent government poses a constant potential 
threat to individual liberty,” the government’s duty to act or refrain 
from acting in a certain manner may not always or necessarily entail 
corresponding enforceable rights for individuals23  Since the 
language of section 7803(a) explicitly imposes an affirmative duty 
on tax officials to respect taxpayer rights, taxpayers no longer bear 
the burden of showing that these rights create legally binding 
obligations on the government.24 
In addition to Abreu and Greenstein’s arguments, it is also 
important to note that section 7803(a)’s statutory inclusion of the 
TBOR gives taxpayers clearer access to pursuing legal redress under 
section 7433.25  In the past, individuals have been quite unsuccessful 
in litigating violations of their rights as taxpayers.26  Now that the 
 
 19  Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1290. 
 20  Id. at 1294-95.  See also IRC § 7803(a). 
 21  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The Government of the United States 
has been emphatically termed a government of law, and not of men. It will certainly cease to 
deserve this high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal 
right.”); Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1295. 
 22  I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-72 (June 10, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-
adopts-taxpayer-bill-of-rights-10-provisions-to-be-highlighted-on-irsgov-in-publication-1. 
 23  Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1299-1300. 
 24  Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1301. 
 25  I.R.C. § 7433 (2017) (“If, in connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect 
to a taxpayer, any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or 
intentionally, or by reason of negligence, disregards any provision of this title, or any 
regulation promulgated under this title, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages 
against the United States . . . .”). 
 26  This historical lack of success has commonly been associated with failure to comply 
with pleading requirements, which can in turn be often attributed to lacking awareness of 
taxpayer rights.  See generally Guthery v. U.S., 562 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D.D.C. 2008); White v. 
Comm’r, 899 F. Supp. 767 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that pro se taxpayers’ Section 7433 
claims were inadequately pleaded, failing to overcome defense of sovereign immunity). 
LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2019  2:57 PM 
342 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 43:2 
TBOR has been incorporated into the Code, taxpayers may point 
directly to section 7803(a) when alleging such violations; in turn, this 
should bring the I.R.S. closer to ensuring that taxpayer rights are 
respected. 
B. The National Taxpayer Advocate 
Despite the TBOR’s incorporation into Publication 1 and its 
codification into section 7803, there are still many hurdles to 
overcome.  Over the last few years, the National Taxpayer 
Advocate’s Annual Report to Congress has repeatedly stressed that 
administrative compliance with TBOR continues to straggle, both 
with spreading awareness to taxpayers and upholding these 
enumerated rights in its ordinary operations.27  At the same time, the 
Taxpayer Advocate Service, known also as the Office of the 
Taxpayer Advocate (hereinafter “TAS”), has recognized the position 
that “the TBOR is not made up of performance standards itself,” but 
rather is “used to develop performance standards and identify which 
performance standards may indicate success in furthering the 
charter’s principles.”28 
The TAS operates as an independent organization within the IRS 
“that helps individual and business payers resolve problems that have 
not been resolved through normal IRS channels and addresses large-
scale, systemic issues that affect groups of taxpayers.”29  Congress 
created the TAS when it passed TBOR 2 in 1996, and further 
expanded its role with TBOR 3 in 1998.30  Today, the TAS operates 
local chapters throughout the country, which provide guidance to 
individual taxpayers.  The TAS department and its chapters operate 
under the direction of the National Taxpayer Advocate, who submits 
annual reports to Congress, advocating for policy and legislative 
changes on behalf of taxpayer interests.31  Since 2007, Nina Olson, 
the incumbent National Taxpayer Advocate, has called for the IRS to 
formally adopt, and for Congress to implement, the current iteration 
of TBOR into the Code.32  Following the 2015 codification, the 
 
 27  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2016 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 99 (2016), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016-ARC/ARC16_ 
Volume1.pdf [hereinafter 2016 REPORT]. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Bartmann, supra note 1, at 597 n.1. 
 30  See I.R.C. § 7803(c). 
 31  I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2). 
 32  Nina E. Olson, Toward a More Perfect Tax System: A Taxpayer Bill of Rights as a 
Framework for Effective Tax Administration, at 1 (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www. 
taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-annual-report/downloads/Toward-a-More-Perfect-Tax-
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National Taxpayer Advocate now recommends that the TBOR be 
adopted as IRC section 1 to further solidify its status as a 
fundamental part of the Code.33 
Although the TAS is technically a part of the IRS, significant 
mechanisms exist to protect the TAS from undue influence.  An 
appointee to the office of National Taxpayer Advocate must not have 
worked for any other part of the IRS for at least two years prior to 
appointment and may not work for the IRS for another five years 
upon leaving the office.34  Additionally, the TAS has a standing 
policy to not disclose taxpayer information to the IRS without due 
cause.35  This serves several purposes, enumerated in the Internal 
Revenue Manual: 
A. To strengthen TAS’s independence and neutrality; 
B. To encourage taxpayers to trust and seek help from TAS 
without fear of retaliation by other IRS employees; 
C. To encourage taxpayers to freely communicate with TAS in 
order to resolve their problems; and 
D. To calm taxpayers’ fears that information provided to TAS 
will be used to the taxpayers’ detriment.36 
The TAS is specifically designed for the benefit of taxpayers.  The 
position’s statutory duties primarily include assisting taxpayers in 
resolving disputes with the IRS, conducting research to identify areas 
where taxpayer interests have been compromised or require 
assistance, and proposing administrative and legislative changes to 
the IRS and Congress to benefit taxpayers.37  The TAS’s role as a 
taxpayer ombudsman is further reflected by its only two statutory 
qualifications for the National Taxpayer Advocate: “(1) a 
background in customer service as well as tax law, and (2) experience 
in representing individual taxpayers.”38 
However, TAS’s duty of keeping taxpayer confidences is by no 
 
System-A-Taxpayer-Bill-of-Rights-as-a-Framework-for-Effective-Tax-Administration.pdf.  
See also NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2015 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 284 (2015), 
http://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC 
/ARC15_Volume1_LR_Introduction.pdf [hereinafter 2015 Full Report]. 
 33  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE PURPLE BOOK: 
COMPILATION OF LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN TAXPAYER RIGHTS AND 
IMPROVE TAX ADMINISTRATION 5-6 (2017), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/ 
Documents/2017-ARC/ARC17_PurpleBook.pdf [hereinafter Purple Book]. 
 34  I.R.C. § 7803(c)(1)(B)(iv). 
 35  IRM 13.1.5.3(4) (Feb. 2, 2011) (Other Federal Laws or Policies Relevant to TAS’s 
Disclosure of Taxpayer’s Information When Working a TAS Case). 
 36  Id. 
 37  I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2)(A). 
 38  I.R.C. § 7803(c)(1)(B)(iii). 
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means absolute.  It is not required to keep confidentiality of 
taxpayer’s information from the IRS; instead, this is maintained “at 
the taxpayer advocate’s discretion.”39  While TAS policy generally 
favors non-disclosure, this policy is superseded in instances where 
the TAS is required to make certain disclosures for standard 
procedure, emergencies, or health and safety reasons.40 
Furthermore, TAS employees (as well as any other federal 
employee) are required to report criminal or fraudulent violations of 
Internal Revenue laws to both the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
IRS Commissioner.41  This duty to report arises after the taxpayer 
refuses to cooperate with the TAS in complying with Internal 
Revenue laws in a timely manner.42  It is also important to note that 
the TAS’s duty of keeping taxpayer confidences under §7803 applies 
primarily to prevent regular disclosures to the IRS.  The TAS is still 
bound to adhere to requests under the Freedom of Information Act, 
subpoenas, and court orders.43 
C. Administrative Deference and Chevron 
Under a principle articulated in Zimmerman v. Commissioner in 
1978, many practitioners considered the TBOR in Publication 1 to be 
merely persuasive and not binding law.44  Even with statutory 
codification, practitioners still debate as to whether this problem has 
been fully resolved. 
Further, many still wonder as to how the IRS, as an 
administrative agency, should be allowed to interpret and enforce 
these rights.45  Generally, administrative law doctrine draws a 
distinction between legislative rules, are legally binding, and non-
legislative or interpretive rules, which have no such effect.46 
 
 39  I.R.C. § 7803(c)(4)(A)(iv). 
 40  IRM 13.1.5.4(1) (Feb. 2, 2011). 
 41  Treas. Reg. §301.7214-1 (1960). 
 42  IRM 13.1.5.3(3)(C) (Feb. 2, 2011). 
 43  IRM 13.1.5.5(5) (Feb. 2, 2011); see also I.R.C. § 7803(c)(4)(A)(iv). 
 44  Zimmerman v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 367, 371 (1978), aff’d 614 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(“[a]uthoritative sources of Federal tax law are in the statutes, regulations, and judicial 
decisions and not in . . . informal publications [of the IRS].”).  Accord Weiss v. Comm’r, 147 
T.C. 179, 196 (2016) (“The IRM lacks the force of law and does not create rights for 
taxpayers.”); see Stephen W. Mazza & Tracy A. Kaye, Taxpayer Rights in the United States: 
Balancing Taxpayer Protections and Compliance, in THE CONFEDERATION FISCALE 
EUROPÉENNE AT 50 YEARS, at 279 (2013). 
 45  See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial 
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2006). 
 46  Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
499, 516 (2011). 
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Legislative rules such as United States Treasury regulations are 
evaluated under the Chevron two-step test for administrative 
deference.  For over twenty years following Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the circuits were split over 
whether Chevron deference should apply to judicial review of 
Treasury regulations.47  In United States v. Mead Corporation, the 
Supreme Court held that administrative regulations may be entitled 
to either mandatory Chevron deference or the more discretionary 
Skidmore deference but did not comment specifically on which level 
of deference applied to Treasury regulations.48  Practitioners called 
for more specific clarification, which the Supreme Court provided in 
a later 2011 case, Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and 
Research v. United States.  In Mayo, the Supreme Court affirmed that 
Treasury regulations, insofar as they are used to promulgate the IRC, 
are accorded Chevron deference.49 
Under the Chevron doctrine, in a case involving a controversy 
over a federal statutory scheme, courts apply a two-step analysis: (1) 
if Congressional intent with regard to the matter has been 
unambiguously expressed, then this ends the matter; (2) if, however, 
Congress has not addressed the issue, then the court “may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by [the agency entrusted with 
promulgation of the statute in question].”50  In its rationale, the 
Supreme Court explained that where Congress leaves an explicit 
statutory gap or ambiguity, “there is an express delegation of 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute 
by regulation”; as long as an administrative interpretation is not 
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,” the 
interpretation will control.51 
The IRS Manual distinguishes between legislative and 
interpretive rules, stipulating that “[where] Congress simply 
provided end result[sic], without any guidance as to how to achieve 
the desired goal, then regulations promulgated to achieve that goal 
are considered to be legislative,” whereas “[i]f Congress provided 
specific rules and merely left gaps for the Secretary to fill, 
 
 47  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Hickman, supra note 45, at 
1538. 
 48  U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 49  Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. U.S., 562 U.S. 44, 56 (2011); see e.g., 
Hickman, supra note 45 at 1538. 
 50  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44. 
 51  Id. at 844. 
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regulations filling those gaps are considered interpretative.”52  
Accordingly, the APA section in the Internal Revenue Manual 
(“IRM”) specifically notes: “IRS/Treasury regulations have the force 
and effect of law even though they are interpretative regulations.”53 
Unlike legislative statutes or administrative regulations, 
however, IRS publications and fact sheets are agency policies, and 
are not on their own considered legally-binding.54  Furthermore, the 
IRM is considered to be a document that only governs the internal 
workings of the IRS, and “does not have the force of law and does 
not confer rights upon taxpayers.”55  When the IRM was first 
introduced in 2014, the modern TBOR existed only in an IRS 
Publication and the IRM itself, but not in any Treasury Regulation 
that would give it legal force and effect.56  However, after the 
TBOR’s was codified into section 7803, the IRS is now bound by 
more than its own impetus to uphold taxpayer rights.57 
II. TAXPAYER RIGHTS 
A. The Right to Privacy 
The IRS has adopted the right to privacy in its formalized 
TBOR, stipulating: 
Taxpayers have the right to expect that any IRS inquiry, 
examination, or enforcement action will comply with the law 
and be no more intrusive than necessary, and will respect all 
due process rights, including search and seizure protections and 
will provide, where applicable, a collection due process 
hearing.58 
The right of privacy is largely a negative right against the IRS, where 
in the event of a tax controversy, taxpayers may expect that the IRS 
 
 52  IRM 32.1.1.2.8 (Aug. 21, 2018). 
 53  IRM 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 (Aug. 21, 2018). 
 54  STEVE JOHNSON ET AL., CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 25 (Paul L. Caron et al. eds., 3rd ed. 
2016) (“Although the press release calls these rights ‘cornerstone,’ ‘fundamental,’ and 
‘important,’ they are matters of administrative policy only and are not judicially 
enforceable.”). 
 55  Fargo v. Comm’r, 447 F.3d 706, 713 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 56  Your Rights as a Taxpayer: The Taxpayer Bill of Rights, IRS PUBLICATION 1 REV. 9-
2017, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 57  I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3) (2017).  See also, Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. Q, § 401 (2015); Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1290. 
 58  Taxpayer Bill of Rights #7: The Right to Privacy, IRS FACT SHEETS FS-2016-15 
(March 2016), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-the-right-to-privacy 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
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will not unnecessarily encroach upon their private lives.59  In a fact 
sheet published in 2016, the IRS elaborates further on these limits, 
which relate to procedures in both tax collections and disputes, 
stating that, with regard to collection, the IRS may not garnish the 
entirety of a taxpayer’s wages.60  Prior to the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act (“TCJA”), administrative levies could not collect on an amount 
greater than the sum of the standard deduction plus the personal 
exemption, or about $10,400; from 2018 onward, this number has 
been increased to $12,000 for individuals and $24,000 for married 
couples.61  In a similar vein, the IRS must first obtain court approval 
before administratively seizing a taxpayer’s personal residence, 
through a burdensome showing of “no reasonable alternative to 
collection of tax debt.”62  Section 6334 details extensive restrictions 
on the IRS’s ability to impose levies on taxpayers, lending additional 
statutory protection.63 
There are also positive aspects to taxpayers’ right to privacy.  
For example, taxpayers need not submit additional financial 
documentation when applying for an Offer-in-Compromise (“OIC”) 
when there is a doubt as to liability.64  According to Treasury 
Regulations, “doubt as to liability exists where there is a genuine 
dispute as to the existence or amount of the correct tax liability under 
the law.”65  In addition, the IRS is usually required to accept an offer 
in compromise “when it is unlikely that the tax liability can be 
collected in full and the amount offered reasonably reflects collection 
potential.”66  In reading the OIC acceptance requirement in 
conjunction with the taxpayer right to privacy, one reaches the 
logical conclusion that a taxpayer may seek to settle a disputed tax 
liability with the IRS solely on the merits of the settlement offer and 
facts surrounding the controversy without the need to submit 
additional financial information that might unduly influence the 
IRS’s decision to accept the offer.67  As mentioned above, should the 
 
 59  Id.  See also Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1301. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id.  The personal exemption has since been repealed, and the standard deduction has 
been increased accordingly.  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 1003 (2017). 
 62  Id. 
 63  I.R.C. § 6334. 
 64  Taxpayer Bill of Rights #7: The Right to Privacy, IRS FACT SHEETS FS-2016-15 
(March 2016), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-the-right-to-privacy 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 65  Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(1) (2002). 
 66  IRM 5.8.1.2.3 (May 5, 2017). 
 67  Taxpayer Bill of Rights #7: The Right to Privacy, IRS FACT SHEETS FS-2016-15 
(March 2016), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-the-right-to-privacy 
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IRS overstep its bounds and infringe on a taxpayer’s right to privacy 
while pursuing a collection action, Section 7433 provides a statutory 
vehicle for such taxpayers to pursue civil damages.68 
The right to privacy is ostensibly meant to guarantee taxpayers 
assurance that information about their financial situation will not be 
intruded upon without due cause; however, the IRS currently remains 
far from full compliance with this right.  Over the past several years, 
Nina Olson’s Annual Congressional Report has detailed various 
complications, wherein the IRS’s current administrative practices 
fail twofold: (1) taxpayers are not always informed of the rights they 
enjoy under TBOR, and (2) IRS employees may sometimes violate 
this right to privacy in the interest of expediency, despite their best 
intentions.69 
For instance, the IRS uses a mechanism dubbed the “Pre-Refund 
Wage Verification Program” to automatically freeze or withhold tax 
refunds when it “detects potentially false wages and withholding” 
from the taxpayer.70  Although the program is useful for vetting out 
potentially-fraudulent filers and eases the administrative burden on 
IRS employees, it is also prone to identifying false positives, which 
can result in withholding refunds from legitimate taxpayers; this in 
turn requires taxpayers to actively pursue the IRS to obtain their 
rightful refunds.71  To verify that their returns are indeed accurate, 
taxpayers may be required to open their books and allow the IRS to 
investigate further into their private lives than is normally necessary 
for ordinary returns.72  In response to the TAS’s recommendation that 
the IRS take steps to improve the detection of false positives and 
perform regular reviews of the program for maintenance, the IRS has 
begun implementing regular reviews of the program and its false 
detection rate and has pledged to periodically share this information 
with the TAS.73 
B. The Right to Confidentiality 
Throughout Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and his 
 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2019). 
 68  I.R.C. § 7433 (2018). 
 69  See e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2015 ANN. REP. TO CONG. REP. CARD, at 11, 
44, 55-57, 63, 90 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/2015arc_reportcard.pdf [hereinafter 
2015 Report Card] (listing various administrative practices that actually or potentially 
infringe taxpayers’ rights to privacy). 
 70  Id. at 11. 
 71  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 69, at 11. 
 72  I.R.C, § 7602 (2018). 
 73  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 69, at 11-12. 
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presidency to this point, great controversy has arisen over his refusal 
to release his tax returns for public scrutiny, breaking with years of 
presidential tradition.74  Despite the political backlash of this action, 
the IRS has consistently upheld President Trump’s right to 
confidentiality, refusing to comment on any of his tax affairs75  In an 
interview with Politico Magazine, then-Commissioner John 
Koskinen refused to confirm or deny whether the IRS was auditing 
the President’s tax returns: 
I had no authority to look at anybody’s returns.  Nobody can, 
unless you’re authorized for the process of examination . . . 
Anyone who looks at anyone’s return is subject to termination.  
We take this stuff seriously . . . But people need to be confident 
in that.  Even with our limited resources, we’ll do a million 
audits this year.76 
The right to confidentiality enjoys substantial statutory 
entrenchment: in addition to section 7803’s mandate, section 6103 
also directs that taxpayer returns and return information be generally 
kept confidential, subject to certain exceptions.77  Generally, this 
means that the IRS may not disclose a taxpayer’s information with 
third parties without the taxpayer’s permission, except as otherwise 
permitted by law.78 
In addition to mere nondisclosure of taxpayer returns and return 
information, IRS employees are also bound from contacting third 
parties (such as one’s employer, neighbors, or bank) in connection 
with adjustment or collection activities without providing 
“reasonable notice in advance” to the taxpayer.79  According to the 
IRS’s fact sheet: 
Taxpayers have the right to expect that any information they 
provide to the IRS will not be disclosed unless authorized by 
the taxpayer or by law.  Taxpayers have the right to expect 
appropriate action will be taken against employees, return 
preparers, and others who wrongfully use or disclose taxpayer 
 
 74  Here’s What We Do and Do Not Know About President Trump’s Tax Returns, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 15, 2017, 6:44 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/ 
2017/03/14/heres-what-we-know-about-trumps-tax-returns/99192032/. 
 75  Grunwald, supra note 4. 
 76  Grunwald, supra note 4. 
 77  See I.R.C. §§ 6103, 7803 (2018). 
 78  Taxpayer Bill of Rights: #8, The Right to Confidentiality, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
(March 2016), https://www.irs.gov/taxpayer-bill-of-rights/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-the-right-
to-confidentiality. 
 79  Id. 
LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2019  2:57 PM 
350 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 43:2 
return information.80 
Like the right to privacy, the right to confidentiality is a negative 
right, imposing an affirmative duty upon the IRS to perform in such 
a manner that does not violate the taxpayer’s rights.81  Section 
6103(a) provides an extensive list of parties whose actions are 
restricted, including federal employees and officers, state employees 
and officers, government contractors, and other various persons with 
access to taxpayer return information.82 
Under section 6103, the right to confidentiality in this context 
does not prohibit the IRS from sharing taxpayer return information, 
as needed, with other parts of the government: state tax agencies may 
submit requests in writing for their own tax administration purposes; 
law enforcement agencies may request information when 
investigating and prosecuting non-tax criminal laws; and other 
federal employees may request where required to discharge their 
duties.83  The IRS is also permitted to disclose to the taxpayer’s 
designated legal representative or other individuals with power of 
attorney or guardianship.84  Persons with material interests in the 
taxpayer’s return information may also submit written requests for 
disclosure from the IRS: in the case of an individual, the taxpayer’s 
spouse or children when filing jointly; in the case of a partnership, 
members of the partnership at the time of the return; and in the case 
of a corporation, designees of the board of directors, principal 
officers, and/or significant shareholders.85 
Even under the right to confidentiality, the list of persons and 
organizations to whom the IRS may permissibly disclose an 
individual’s tax return information is extensive.  Since most of these 
exceptions require a militating cause in order to request information, 
most law-abiding taxpayers need not fret.  However, high-profile 
individuals and large corporations may be more concerned about 
information leaks or impermissible disclosures, such as where tax 
preparers or others with access may lack the proper security 
precautions or even have incentive to disclose sensitive 
information.86 
 
 80  Id. 
 81  See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 17, at 1301. 
 82  I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2018). 
 83  I.R.C. § 6103 (2018); see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6103(f) (pertaining to Congressional 
Committees), 6103(g) (pertaining to POTUS and other executive employees), 6103(h) (2018) 
(pertaining to Departments of the Treasury and Justice). 
 84  I.R.C. § 6103(c), 6103(e)(2), 6103(e)(6) (2018). 
 85  I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1) (2018). 
 86  See, e.g., Gregg Birnbaum, Who is Leaking Donald Trump’s Tax Returns?, NBC NEWS 
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Section 7216 stipulates criminal penalties for tax professional 
who prepare tax returns that violate section 6103’s requirements: a 
misdemeanor conviction, accompanied by a fine of up to $1,000 and/
or a prison sentence of one year.87  Section 7213 holds much heavier 
penalties for government employees, to can be subjected to automatic 
termination, as well as a $5,000 fine and/or a five-year prison 
sentence for a single unauthorized disclosure.88  In addition to 
criminal penalties, section 7431 specifies that such violators may 
also be liable for hefty civil damages to compromised taxpayers.89 
III. PURSUING TAX ADMINISTRATION EFFICIENCY AND VOLUNTARY 
COMPLIANCE 
Although the TBOR applies in many different circumstances, 
many taxpayers are likely familiar with deficiency assessments and 
collection actions.  In addition to the taxpayers’ rights to “challenge 
the IRS’s position” and to “a fair and just tax system,” taxpayers’ 
rights to privacy and confidentiality may also be implicated when 
they seek to appeal inaccurate assessments, remedy tax liens, or 
reach alternative arrangements such as payment plans or settlement 
offers. 
A. Administrative Tools: Federal Tax Liens and Levies 
After the IRS has assessed a tax deficiency and delivered a 
notice of deficiency to the taxpayer, a federal tax lien is the IRS’s 
usual first exercise of collecting power in response to non-payment.90  
The IRS uses three methods to enforce a federal tax lien: (1) 
administrative wage levy, (2) administrative property seizure, and (3) 
judicial collection.91  Though the IRS may seek collection through 
suit even without creating the lien, the lien is usually preferred for 
its administrative expediency.92 
 
(Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/who-leaking-donald-trump-s-tax-
returns-n733661 (examining the circumstances around the March 14, 2017, leak of President 
Trump’s 2005 tax return). 
 87  I.R.C. § 7216(a)(2) (2018). 
 88  I.R.C. § 7213(a) (2018). 
 89  I.R.C. § 7431 (2018). 
 90  I.R.C. § 6321 (2018).  See also Mather & Weisman, Federal Tax Collection Procedure 
– Liens, Levies, Suits, and Third Party Liability, 637-2nd T.M., § I: Introduction (Bloomberg 
Law).  
 91  I.R.C. §§ 6321, 6331. 
 92  U.S. v. Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry., 249 F. 678, 685 (6th Cir. 1918) 
(“[W]here a tax of a fixed percentage is imposed by statute [and its amount or value] can be 
ascertained and determined, on evidence, by a court, a suit for the tax will lie [with the 
government], without an assessment.”). 
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Typically, “the Government may collect taxes of a delinquent 
taxpayer ‘by levy upon all property and rights to property . . . 
belonging to such person.”93  After property has been levied, any 
person in possession of such encumbered property must surrender  it 
to the IRS.94  If, however, the IRS assesses a liability as “fully 
satisfied” or “legally unenforceable,” Section 6325 requires related 
property liens to be released within thirty days.95  Although the IRS 
has a wide array of tools available to enforce its collection duties, it 
must adhere to Collection Due Process and must offer alternative 
arrangements, such as Offers-in-Compromise, for taxpayers with 
unique situations.96 
i. Restriction on Administrative Tools: Collection Due 
Process (CDP) 
The concept of Collection Due Process (CDP) was created in 
1998 to provide taxpayers with the right to appeal lien and levy 
actions from the IRS.97  According to National Taxpayer Advocate’s 
Annual Congressional Report, “Congress intended the IRS to provide 
meaningful Collection Due Process (CDP) hearings to taxpayers, 
weighing their concerns that any collection action be no more 
intrusive than necessary against the government’s need for the 
efficient collection of taxes.”98  Since this balancing test forms the 
heart of a CDP hearing, TAS has consequently called upon the IRS 
to adopt a formal policy statement on this CDP balancing test in 
accordance with congressional intent.99 
Generally under CDP principles, the IRS must serve a formal 
 
 93  United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713 (1985) (quoting I.R.C. § 
6331(a)). 
 94  Id.  See also I.R.C. § 6332(a). 
 95  I.R.C. § 6325(a).  
 96  Should the IRS negligently or knowingly fail to provide proper notice or timely 
release these liens, taxpayers may seek compensatory damages through section 7432 ; 
I.R.C. § 7432 (1988).  However, taxpayers have been largely unsuccessful in seeking relief 
under this provision, often due to their failure to first fully exhaust administrative remedies or 
because the courts have interpreted fairly wide latitude.  See e.g., Hook v. U.S., 624 Fed. 
Appx. 972 (10th Cir. 2015) (dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Clark 
v. United States, 462 Fed. Appx. 719 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissing for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies); Don Johnson Motors, Inc. v. U.S., 453 Fed. Appx. 526 (5th Cir. 
2011) (finding that the IRS properly issued notices of intent to levy and tax lien and taxpayer 
failed to exhaust remedies). 
 97  Collection Due Process, PHILIP C. COOK LOW-INCOME TAXPAYER CLINIC, 
http://taxclinic.law.gsu.edu/collections-process/collection-due-process/ (last visited Feb. 2, 
2019). 
 98  2015 Full Report, supra note 32 at 93. 
 99  2015 Full Report, supra note 32 at 93-94. 
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notice of a federal tax lien filing on the taxpayer within five business 
days of filing, pursuant to Section 6320.100  This notice must be 
served in a concrete manner which is either in person, left at the 
taxpayer’s dwelling or usual place of business, or sent by certified 
mail.  This notice must also detail the taxpayer’s amount of unpaid 
tax, the taxpayer’s right to request an administrative hearing, the 
process for administratively appealing the lien, and the procedures 
for curing the lien.101 
Similar to the federal tax lien, a property levy is also a powerful 
and convenient administrative tool that removes the onus of seeking 
payment from the IRS and transfers the burden upon the delinquent 
taxpayer to seek redress.102  To prevent abuse of property levy, the 
Code imposes notice requirements before it may be used.103  
Generally, a formal notice of intent to levy must be served on the 
delinquent taxpayer at least thirty days before a taxpayer’s wages or 
property are levied, and it must include detailed information as to the 
levy process, availability of administrative appeals, and methods of 
curing the levy.104 
Interestingly, despite the taxpayer’s innate interest in privacy, it 
sometimes to one’s benefit to disclose one’s financial condition to 
the IRS.  Following a 2009 Tax Court decision, the IRS is now 
required to release levies upon determining that such levies would 
cause a taxpayer undue economic hardship (a point discussed further 
below), regardless of whether the taxpayer was current on his/her tax 
returns.105  Both tax practitioners and the TAS hailed this as a major 
win for taxpayers.  TAS then worked with the IRS to revise the Pre-
Levy Considerations section of the IRM to ensure that taxpayers 
receive their rights to a fair and just tax system.106  The IRM now 
specifically requires that IRS employees consider several factors 
 
 100  Collection Due Process (CDP) FAQs, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/appeals/collection-due-process-cdp-faqs  (last visited Feb. 2, 
2019). 
 101  I.R.C. § 6320(a) (2018).  See also I.R.C. § 6326 (2018). 
 102  I.R.C. § 6331 (2018). 
 103  I.R.C. § 6331(d) (2018). 
 104  I.R.C. § 6331(d)(2) (2018). See also I.R.C. § 6331(d)(3) (2018) (removing notice 
requirements where the Treasury Secretary finds that collection of tax is in jeopardy). 
 105  Vinatieri v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 392, 401-02 (2009) (agreeing with IRS finding of 
economic hardship where petitioner’s medical condition imposed significant expenses and 
permitted only part-time employment, and petitioner’s assets totaled less than $1000).  See 
also I.R.C. § 6343(a)(1)(D).  But see Link v. Comm’r, 2013 WL 608396, at *5 (2013) 
(distinguishing Vinatieri and refusing to release levy where reasonable IRS determination 
disagreed with petitioner’s economic hardship claim). 
 106  Bartmann, supra note 1, at 619-20. 
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before implementing a property levy on taxpayers, including whether 
such a levy would cause economic hardship due to the taxpayer’s 
known financial condition, the taxpayer’s responsiveness to attempts 
at contact and collection, the taxpayer’s compliance history, and the 
taxpayer’s current status and efforts in paying current taxes.107  An 
additional note in the Manual further instructs employees to refrain 
from issuing levies as a way to secure other compliance, such as 
filing missing tax returns, when the Service determines that the levy 
would cause economic hardship.108 
Once the IRS has imposed a property levy, the taxpayer 
generally may not appeal the amount of unpaid tax due without 
submitting new information that was not previously considered in the 
initial audit.109  Instead, the taxpayer must either file for a refund 
(after paying the amount due to cure the assessed deficiency) or file 
an “Offer-in-Compromise, Doubt as to Liability.”110  The claim for 
refund begins the administrative review process anew; if the IRS 
determines that the levy was wrongfully made, it will either return 
the levied property or the sum of money received in initial 
satisfaction of the levy.111  On the other hand, a pending OIC will 
forestall the IRS from placing future levies with respect to the 
liability in question, though it will not prevent potential interest and 
penalties from accruing.112  In the event that the IRS rejects a 
taxpayer’s OIC, the IRS will further refrain from levying against the 
taxpayer’s property for thirty days following rejection, as well as for 
the period in which an administrative appeal of the rejection is 
considered.113 
The TAS has also noted that “[t]he balancing test also validates 
the taxpayer’s right to privacy by taking into account the 
invasiveness of enforcement actions and the due process rights of the 
taxpayer.”114  Upon review of the IRS’s CDP procedures and 
examination of case law, the TAS found that the IRS Office of 
Appeals failed to properly account for the CDP balancing test, 
especially with regard to legitimate taxpayer concerns about the 
 
 107  IRM 5.11.1.3.1(2) (Nov. 9, 2011). 
 108  Id. 
 109  Collection Due Process (CDP) FAQs, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
https://www.irs.gov/compliance/appeals/collection-due-process-cdp-faqs (last visited Nov. 
10, 2017). 
 110  Id. 
 111  See I.R.C. § 6343 (2018). 
 112  Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(g)(1) (2002). 
 113  Id. 
 114  NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 32, at 93. 
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intrusiveness of the proposed collection action.115  As a result, the 
TAS concluded that “lack of detailed and specific procedures 
describing how to conduct the balancing test, along with inadequate 
training on how to apply such a test, undermines the congressional 
intent to enhance taxpayer protections through CDP hearings, and 
erodes core taxpayer rights.”116 
B. Administrative Alternatives to Liens, Levies, and Tax Litigation 
i. Offers-in-Compromise (“OIC”) 
The OIC program exists as an alternative method of satisfying 
an unpaid tax liability, particularly where the taxpayer’s financial 
circumstances may be difficult to gauge or calculate with substantial 
accuracy.117  Under section 7122, the Treasury Department, and by 
extension, the IRS, may accept either lump-sum or periodic payment 
offers-in-compromise as satisfaction of either civil or criminal 
liability arising from internal revenue laws.118  Before submitting an 
offer, a taxpayer must first have filed all legally required tax returns, 
as well as remained up to date on required estimated tax payments 
for the current tax year.119 
According to the Internal Revenue Manual, “[t]he [IRS] will 
accept an offer in compromise when it is unlikely that the tax liability 
can be collected in full and the amount offered reasonably reflects 
collection potential.”120  Furthermore, “no offer to compromise may 
be rejected solely on the basis of the amount of the offer without 
(first) evaluating that offer,” nor may the IRS “reject an offer-in-
compromise from a low-income taxpayer solely on the basis of the 
amount of the offer.”121  In submitting an offer to the IRS, the 
taxpayer must make the request “in writing . . . under penalty of 
perjury, and must [include] all of the information prescribed or 
requested. . . .”122  Furthermore, a taxpayer must attach at least 
 
 115  NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 32, at 93. 
 116  NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 32, at 93. 
 117  I.R.C. § 7122 (2018). 
 118  I.R.C. § 7122 (2018). 
 119  Form 656-B Offer in Compromise, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f656b.pdf (last visited April 1, 2019). 
 120  IRM 1.2.14.1.17 (Jan. 30, 1992) (emphasis in original).  But see Fargo v. Comm’r, 447 
F.3d 706, 713 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[E]ven if the Manual does recommend negotiation, it contains 
numerous provisions that vest Appeals Officers with the discretion to accept or reject offers-
in-compromise.”).  
 121  Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(f)(3) (2002); I.R.C. § 7122(d)(3)(A). 
 122  Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(d)(1) (2002). 
LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2019  2:57 PM 
356 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 43:2 
twenty percent of the proffered lump sum settlement or an entire 
monthly payment, and continue to make regular monthly payments 
while the OIC is under consideration.123  Once the IRS accepts an 
OIC, the taxpayer is required to continue to timely file, and to pay 
all required tax returns and estimated tax payments for five years.124  
Should the taxpayer fail to do so, the IRS considers the OIC to be in 
default and reinstates the original tax liability with accrued interest 
and penalties, less payments made.125 
Generally, there are three broad rationales by which a taxpayer-
offeror may seek to offer settlement of tax liability under the OIC: 
(1) doubt as to liability (DATL), (2) doubt as to collectibility 
(DATC), and (3) promotion of effective tax administration.126 
As discussed in Part II(A), DATL requires the IRS to find “a 
genuine dispute as to the existence or amount of the correct tax 
liability under the law.”127  Here, the right to privacy limits the issue 
solely to the taxpayer’s liability rather than the taxpayer’s ability to 
pay, which under collectability is a separate issue. 
Under a DATC rationale a taxpayer’s OIC can succeed by 
showing that “the taxpayer’s assets and income are less than the full 
amount of the liability.”128  Since the taxpayer must demonstrate a 
financial inability to pay, this inherently requires at least a partial 
concession of the taxpayer’s right to privacy; nonetheless, the IRS 
may not unreasonably probe further into the taxpayer’s affairs.  The 
IRS may pierce this right to privacy when there is reason to suspect 
taxpayer misrepresentation, or a frivolous submission that would 
impact the acceptance of the OIC.129 
Finally, a successful OIC “based on promotion of effective tax 
administration” is dependent on whether “collection of the full 
liability would cause the taxpayer economic hardship.”130  The 
Treasury Regulations define economic hardship as circumstances in 
which full or partial satisfaction of the liability would “cause an 
individual taxpayer to be unable to pay his or her reasonable basic 
 
 123  Form 656-B Offer in Compromise, supra note 120, at 3. 
 124  Id. at 6. 
 125  Id. 
 126  See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1 (2019); see also IRS, Taxpayer Bill of Rights #10: The 
Right to a Fair and Just Tax System, IRS FACT SHEETS FS-2015-18 (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-number-10-the-right-to-a-fair-and-
just-tax-system. 
 127  26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1 (b)(1) (2019). 
 128  26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1(b)(2) (2019). 
 129  See I.R.C. § 7122(g) (2018); see also I.R.C. § 6702(b)(2)(A) (2018). 
 130  26 C.F.R. § 301.7122-1 § 301.7122-1(b)(3)(i) (2019). 
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living expenses.”131  “Reasonable basic living expenses” are 
determined on a case-by-case basis depending on relevant facts the 
taxpayer supplied, such as ability to earn, number of dependents, 
food, clothing, housing, transportation, medical expenses, and local 
cost of living.132  As with DATC, the taxpayer must also submit an 
effective tax administration or economic hardship OIC and its 
supplementary information in good faith; falsification of financial 
information, inflation of expenses or costs, or any other form of 
material misrepresentation will cause the IRS to reject the OIC.133  
Under these statutory rules and administrative policies regarding 
OIC, the circumstances in which the IRS may reject offers are likely 
those where misrepresentation occurs, where the IRS deems that the 
taxpayer is indeed liable for and able to pay the amount in 
controversy without economic hardship, and where the IRS deems 
the offer to be inadequate according to prescribed guidelines.134 
In furthering the IRS’s interest in taxpayer compliance and 
efficient tax collection, the OIC fundamentally exists as an expedient 
administrative tool to resolve matters through negotiation and 
compromise, where fully litigating a tax controversy would be 
burdensome for both sides.135  The OIC program exists primarily to 
“effect collection of what can reasonably be collected at the earliest 
possible time and at the least cost to the Government” and to 
“provide the taxpayer a fresh start toward future voluntary 
compliance with all filing and payment requirements.”136 
Inasmuch as the OIC application involves direct communication 
between Service collection specialists and the taxpayers or their 
representatives, the taxpayer’s rights to both privacy and 
confidentiality are once again implicated.137  There are several 
important reasons why taxpayers seeking to settle their tax liabilities 
may prefer to pursue an OIC: 1) the offer process requires taxpayers 
to confront and examine their personal finances and tax reporting 
history; and 2) favorable outcomes may alter taxpayer perceptions in 
favor of the Service, “not as a villain or a leviathan but as an agency 
committed to service and support.”138 
 
 131  Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4)(i) (1994). 
 132  Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4)(ii) (1994). 
 133  Treas. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4)(iii) (1994). 
 134  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(f) (2002); I.R.C. § 7122(d)(1). 
 135  See IRM 5.8.1 (Aug. 1, 2017).  See also I.R.C. § 7122. 
 136  IRM 5.8.1.2.4 (Sept. 23, 2008). 
 137  Joseph C. Dugan, Compromising Compliance? The Service Offer in Compromise 
Program and Opportunities for Reform, 70 TAX LAW 609, 612-13 (2017). 
 138  Id. 
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IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE IRS 
As discussed earlier, both former IRS Commissioner Koskinen 
and incumbent National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson have agreed 
on the fact that the IRS returns significantly more money in revenue 
than it takes from its allotted budget.  By way of numbers, the IRS 
collected $2.86 trillion on a budget of $11.2 billion in Fiscal Year 
2013, amounting to an average ROI of about 255:1.139  In Fiscal Year 
2017, the IRS collected $3.4 trillion on a budget of $12.71 billion.140  
Of these staggering amounts of collected revenue, the TAS estimates 
that ninety-eight percent comes from timely and voluntary taxpayer 
compliance, and a mere two percent is derived from IRS enforcement 
actions.141  Although enforcement actions are important to ensure 
continued future compliance, they remain grossly inefficient from a 
purely financial perspective. 
A. Five Years of Budget Cuts 
Despite the IRS’s vital mission, however, it has not received the 
corresponding support required from Congress.  According to the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the IRS’s 2018 enforcement 
budget was approximately 23% less than in 2010, after adjusting for 
inflation.142  In 2017, the IRS audited only 1 in 161 individual tax 
returns, down from 1 in 90 in 2011; likewise the IRS audited only 1 
in 101 corporate returns in 2017, down from 1 in 61 in 2012.143  
Commissioner Koskinen estimates that the IRS’s inability to conduct 
its proper auditing activities costs the government approximately $6 
billion in uncollected revenue each year.144  Furthermore, the IRS’s 
outdated tech systems, some “still running some applications from 
when JFK was president,” present additional logistical and security 
concerns that hinder the IRS’s ability to efficiently fulfill its 
 
 139  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2013 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 21, 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/2013FullReport/IRS-BUDGET-The-IRS-
Desperately-Needs-More-Funding-to-Serve-Taxpayers-and-Increase-Voluntary-
Compliance.pdf. See also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-165, IRS’S FISCAL 
YEARS 2013 AND 2012 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS at 76 (2018). 
 140  GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-165 at 57, IRS’S FISCAL YEARS 2017 AND 
2016 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 57 (2018). 
 141  Hearing on IRS FY 2016 Budget Request Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. and Gen. 
Gov’t Comm. on Approps., 114th Cong. 1-2, (2015) (statement of Nina E. Olson, Nat’l 
Taxpayer Advocate). 
 142  Emily Horton, Underfunded IRS Continues to Audit Less, CENTER ON BUDGET AND 
POLICY PRIORITIES (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/underfunded-irs-continues-
to-audit-less.  
 143  Id. 
 144  Grunwald, supra note 4. 
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mission.145 
In her 2017 Congressional Report, Nina Olson noted that 
underfunding has directly resulted in a situation where “shortcuts 
have become the norm, and shortcuts are incompatible with high-
quality tax administration.”146  Olson also reiterated the call to 
provide the IRS with more funding, noting that the 2017 tax reform 
bill would place even more strain on an overexerted system already 
struggling to balance administrative efficiency, promotion of 
taxpayer compliance, and protection of taxpayer rights.147 
In response to regular annual budget cuts of nearly twenty-
percent from fiscal years 2010 to 2016, the IRS has implemented a 
“Future State Plan,” shifting much of its in-person and telephone 
taxpayer services to online channels and self-service.148  The IRS 
Office of Appeals has adopted a policy where most tax appeal 
conferences are conducted by telephone instead of face-to-face.149  
The TAS has noted that this may damage the taxpayer’s assurance of 
the right to confidentiality; where multiple participants phone into an 
appeals conference, the risk of unauthorized disclosure rises 
steeply.150  However, the IRS has a strong budget-conscious reason 
for shifting channels from in-person to phones, and from phones to 
online services:  in 2013, the average customer call to a call center 
may have cost $7.50, whereas the same call to an automated 
interactive voice response system would cost only $0.32.151 
Taxpayers “feel more at ease when speaking with local 
representatives who fully understand their language and idiomatic 
expressions.”152  However, the Future State Plan drastically inhibits 
the ability for taxpayers to seek in-person communications.153  The 
TAS reports that in instances where telephone or in-person 
conferences are the preferred method of communication, taxpayers 
 
 145  Grunwald, supra note 4. 
 146  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2017 ANN. REP. TO CONG. vii, 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-ARC/ARC17_ 
Volume1.pdf [hereinafter “2017 Report”]. 
 147  Id. 
 148  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2016 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 64-65, 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016-ARC/ARC16_ 
Volume1.pdf [hereinafter “2016 Report”]. 
 149  See IRM 8.6.1.4.1 (Oct. 1, 2016). 
 150  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 149 at 106. 
 151  Daniela Yu & John H. Fleming, How Customers Interact with Their Banks, GALLUP 
(May 7, 2013), http://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/162107/customers-interact- 
banks.aspx?version=print. 
 152  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 149, at 92. 
 153  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 149, at 66. 
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“may feel alienated, frustrated, and disengaged from the tax system,” 
which may cause them to make emotional spur-of-the-moment 
decisions that they later regret.154  However, according to the 
Government Accountability Office’s most recent IRS report, online 
services are increasingly becoming taxpayers’ preferred medium of 
interaction with the agency.155  This represents an important 
opportunity for the IRS to begin re-expanding its availability and 
services to taxpayers while operating on a razor-thin budget. 
The IRS also began implementing an increasing number of user 
fees for various services, such as entrance into installment 
agreements, offers-in-compromise, and private letter rulings.156  As 
discussed above, installment agreements and OICs are exercises in 
taxpayers’ rights to privacy, confidentiality, and a fa ir and just tax 
system; accordingly, the TAS has asserted that imposition of the 
slightest fees on such services infringes on these rights, and has 
called on Congress to prohibit such practices.157  While the TAS 
makes a compelling argument that the IRS may well have 
overstepped its bounds in requiring taxpayers to pay fees for merely 
exercising their rights, there is nonetheless a compelling 
countervailing justification that the IRS might present: these fees are 
meant to offset associated costs, and to prevent excessive 
administrative burdens on the IRS by having requesting taxpayers 
internalize some of the costs.158  Nonetheless, irrespective of whether 
such fees are justified, their very imposition reflects the Service’s 
desperate state and its need for more funding and resources. 
V. CONCLUSION 
According to the TAS, the prevailing purpose of tax 
administration is to “enable voluntary compliance which can be 
achieved by providing services, creating a culture of trust, and 
 
 154  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 149, at 66. 
 155  GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-165, IRS’S FISCAL YEARS 2017 AND 
2016 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS at 29 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689341.pdf; 
Grunwald, supra note 4 (quoting Commissioner Koskinen: “Now look, we’ve moved more 
processing online, and we’ve gotten even more efficient . . . [w]e still maintain a huge 
technology system that processes over 200 million returns a year . . . [a]nd we have to answer 
the phone when people call.  When the budget gets cut, everything suffers.”). 
 156  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 147, at 307-08. 
 157  NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 147, at 307-08. 
 158  This is scarcely an isolated situation where fees might be permissibly imposed on 
exercising legal rights; after all, citizens must pay court fees when seeking judicial remedies.  
It stands to reason, however, that overly burdensome fees might indeed impermissibly 
discourage citizens from properly exercising their rights; the solution likely lies somewhere 
in between balancing these interests.  
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promoting an understanding of the role taxes play in a civilized 
society.”159  Woefully crippled by budget cuts, while the IRS has 
taken admirable steps toward this goal, it remains a servant beholden 
to many masters: taxpayers’ rights, efficient tax collection, and 
enforcement. 
Some have opined that “such a system requires more than the 
plain statement of rights.  Only a system based on actions that follow 
the defined policy goals can achieve the necessary fairness 
considerations.”160  The relatively new introduction of a slew of 
procedural rights, now codified in law and given legally binding 
power, has perhaps exacerbated the difficulty of heavy agency 
budget cuts to the point where some professionals have hypothesized 
as “what may be taxpayer rights in the eyes of some are procedural 
burdens in the eye of the tax administrator.”161  The IRS must 
therefore continue to pursue measures in voluntary compliance if it 
is to succeed in fulfilling its multiple (and sometimes divergent) 
responsibilities. 
 
 
 159  2016 Report, supra note 149, at 102. 
 160  Fogg & Jozipovic, supra note 10, at 564. 
 161  Mazza & Kaye, supra note 44, at 297. 
